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Abstract
Privacy concerns with sensitive data are receiving increasing attention. In this paper, we study
local differential privacy (LDP) in interactive decentralized optimization. By constructing random
local aggregators, we propose a framework to amplify LDP by a constant. We take Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM), and decentralized gradient descent as two concrete
examples, where experiments support our theory. In an asymptotic view, we address the following
question: Under LDP, is it possible to design a distributed private minimizer for arbitrary closed
convex constraints with utility loss not explicitly dependent on dimensionality? As an affiliated result,
we also show that with merely linear secret sharing, information theoretic privacy is achievable for
bounded colluding agents.
1 Introduction
Due to the underlying intensive computation and memory requirement in large-scale machine learning,
distributed learning has witnessed tremendous development in recent years. In general, there exist
two typical scenarios of distributed optimization. The first one assumes a central server to collect and
average out local estimates from each agent to update the global model, for example, federated learning
[1],[2],[3],[4]. When a "data fusion" center is costly or infeasible, one recourse is a decentralized approach
where each agent broadcasts updates to its neighbors and agents collaboratively approach the global
optimum [5],[6],[7],[8].
While there is great interest in advances to accelerate the performance of optimization algorithms,
privacy preservation is also equally important to many machine learning tasks, especially in the processing
of medical records and financial data. Techniques are required to quantify privacy loss during processing,
and differential privacy (DP) is one of the best known rigorous theoretical mechanisms that serves this
purpose. There is a large body of DP based Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) work [4],[9],[10],[11],
[12], [13],[14], [15] and DP-based k-means[16], Bayesian learning [17], identity testing [18] and deep
learning [19], [20] works. Given a randomized algorithm, DP offers a provable guarantee against statistical
inference that its output is insensitive to a slight change in the input dataset, for example, replacement
of a single datapoint. Thus, from outputs observed, it is hard to distinguish the participation of an
individual. The notion of DP was initially developed with a centralized view. Under central DP
or distributed learning with trusted central servers, using secure aggregator techniques [21], [22] or
subsampling techniques with secrecy of intermediate computation [23],[24], many elegant mechanisms of
privacy amplification have been proposed.
However, agents may not trust any other parties to collect their local data. To this end, a stronger
notion is local differential privacy (LDP) [25], [26] in the distributed scenario, where each agent can
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run a randomization procedure locally and the privacy of an individual is still guaranteed even with a
malicious collector. LDP has been adopted by Apple, Microsoft and Google as one formal definition of
privacy [27], [28], [29]. Nonetheless, in contrast to the central model, LDP is far less studied despite
successful deployment in industry [30]. Especially for private optimization, in the central model, the
optimization protocol can be viewed as a black box since no information leakage can occur during the
execution. Perturbation can be elegantly added only in the objective function, at the beginning, or
the output, at the end. Well-known objective/output perturbation methods (e.g. [4]) and follow-up
work [31], [32], [33] all capture this idea. For LDP, though one can still apply the above techniques in
an non-interactive manner by directly processing the local optimum from each user [34],[12],[35], high
sample complexity to compensate for accuracy loss may be required.
In an interactive decentralized optimization, additional privacy loss arises from agents’ cooperation.
To investigate LDP in general, we need concrete algorithms to support our analysis. In general, there are
two types of decentralized optimization. One is (sub)gradient based, such as decentralized (stochastic)
gradient descent (GD) methods [8], [7], [36], and EXTRA [37]. The second relies on solving a constrained
problem with dual variables to minimize some Lagrangian function, such as Alternative Direction Method
of Multipliers (ADMM) [38]. Though both proceed in an iterative manner, the computation of GD in
each step can be less expensive compared to ADMM. Nevertheless, for general convex problems, the
convergence rate of decentralized GD is O(1/√K) and that of ADMM is O(1/K) [5], where K denotes
the number of iterations. Under such a framework, agents enrolled in computing only need to share the
states of optimization with neighbors. However, privacy loss also arises from such information exchange,
since exposed intermediate results can be easily used to learn the sensitive parameters of the local private
functions. Incorporating cryptographic methods, such as (partial) homomorphic encryption [39], [40],
[41] can come with high overhead especially in large-scale optimization. Alternatively, under the lens
of DP, the most common approach is to apply perturbed local estimates during the update exchange
in decentralized algorithms [42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48]. Although heuristic exploration, such as
gradually increasing the step penalty [43], can improve the utility-privacy tradeoff, existing works lack
insights into the fundamentals of algorithmic convergence with noise perturbation.
Problem Statement: Consider a decentralized optimization problem across N agents in a connected
network. The network is modeled by an undirected graph G (N , E ). Nodes are indexed as N = {1, ..., N}
and when two nodes i and j are neighbors that can communicate, (i, j) ∈ E . In general, we assume each
node holds a function fi(xi) that we regard as a loss function determined by samples held locally with
the parameter xi to be optimized. Throughout the rest of the paper, we always assume that fi(·) is a
differentiable convex function C → R and xi ∈ C ⊂ Rd. C can be viewed as the constraint, assumed to
be a closed convex set. In general, we express the objective function to minimize as
min
x[1:N ]
N∑
i=1
fi(xi), s.t .
N∑
i=1
Aixi = c, (1)
under a linear constraint. In many learning problems, x[1:N ] stand for one parameter to be collaboratively
optimized, where [1 : N] is the compact form of {1, 2, ..., N}. We term the problem as consensus
optimization if the constraint requires that all xi be equal, which can also be rewritten as a linear
constraint
∑N
i=1 Aixi = 0, where Ai includes the graph connectivity [5].
Differential Privacy: For a randomized algorithm A and a dataset D as its input, we call D ′
adjacent to D if D and D ′ only differ in one data point. Quantitatively, we say A achieves -DP if for any
D ′ and any set S in the domain of A (·), supD′,S | log(Pr[A (D) ∈ S]) − log(Pr[A (D ′) ∈ S])| ≤  . Relaxed
DP in the form (, δ) can be found in [49]. To embed the notion of DP in the decentralized optimization
setting, in this paper, A corresponds to the optimization algorithm selected, while the functions fi
behave as the inputs and are the privacy concern. In the local version, each agent does not trust anyone
and, in the worst case, all other parties are colluding against some agent i to learn some sensitive
information of fi. With symmetry, we consider the view of agent i and select D = { f1, ..., fi, ..., fN } and
D ′ = { f1, ..., fˆi, ..., fN }, where fˆi represents some possible candidate of fi. Following [25], we define a
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quantifiable measure, -LDP, of A on some output S as
(S) = sup
D,D′
 log(Pr[D |S]) − log(Pr[D ′ |S]) (2)
Notice that we have dropped the dependence of (S) on the index i for notational brevity.
Methodology Overview: We first review the basic updating subroutine in decentralized gradient
descent. Let xki denote the local estimate of the global optimum for agent i at round k. In consensus
optimization, a naively noisy form of decentralized GD [8], [7] can be described as,
xk+1i :=
N∑
i=1
wi j x
k
j
A
− ηk+1∇ fi(xki )B + ∆
k+1
i (3)
where wi j ∈ [0, 1] is the weight assigned to xkj such that
∑N
j=1 wi j = 1 and ηk+1 is the step size at round
(k + 1). ∆k+1i denotes the noise added, which is assumed to be Laplace noise. Therefore, Part A in
(3) is a weighted average of updates collected from the last iteration and Part B corresponds to the
gradient step taken. In the typical case (3), gradient descent is randomized by resorting to perturbation
∆k+1i . One can apply a stochastic gradient instead, but the subsampling does not amplify privacy [10].
However, we show that carefully designed randomization can reshape the output distribution to produce
a sharpened privacy loss. In Section 2, it is noted that the optimization protocol may take dozens of
steps and divergence among xki , i ∈ [1 : N], always exists. Now, for instance, imagine if we use random
weights w˜i j instead in (3), which are independently selected across each iteration: Part A becomes a
random variable within some neighborhood of xki , while Part B remains the same. In the (k + 1)th
iteration, conditional on xki , i ∈ [1 : N], and fi, xk+1i then follows a mixture Laplace distribution with a
random mean. Similarly, recalling the updating rule of ADMM with dual method for (1), each update
relies on solving an optimization problem:
xk+1i := arg minxi
L(xk1, ..., xi, ..., xkN, λk) +
ρ
2
Aixi + N∑
j,i
Aj xkj − c
2 + Γ2 xi − xki 2 + ∆k+1i (4)
where the Lagrangian function is defined as L(x1, ..., xN, λ) = ∑Ni=1 fi(xi) − λT (∑Ni=1 Aixi − c). The
Lagrangian multiplier λk+1 is updated through λk+1 := λk − ζ(∑Ni=1 Aixk+1i − c). If we allow each agent to
independently select random penalties ρ and Γ across iterations, clearly, a similar mixture Laplace with
random mean, xk+1i is produced. While a random mean amplifies the uncertainty, trivially incorporating
such an idea in existing algorithms may easily lead to unclear convergence guarantees or cumbersome
privacy analysis.
Contribution and organization: In this paper, we study the LDP of interactive decentralized
optimization from both asymptotic and non-asymptotic perspectives.
(i) Taking GD and ADMM as two examples, we propose a framework of decentralized optimization with
varying parameters. A unified local privacy analysis is presented in Theorem 2.2 with assumptions
only on local sensitivity and we quantify the privacy amplification constant in Theorem 2.3.
Rigorous analysis on the convergence rate and the utility-privacy tradeoff for proposed algorithms
are included in Theorems 3.1-3.3 and Theorem 3.4, for ADMM and GD, respectively. Appealingly,
in contrast to noise perturbation, which always brings a compromise in utility, we show with
carefully selected parameters, the proposed schemes enjoy the same convergence rate as before.
Experiments support the theory.
(ii) From an asymptotic viewpoint, we follow a rich line of work to study LDP in high dimensional
optimization. In the central model, it is well understood that with certain sparsity of C, utility
loss can scale logarithmically in dimensionality d, for example in sparse linear regression (LASSO)
[11]. In this paper, we explore such dimensional dependence from the objective function fi’s side.
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Algorithm 1 Modified Private ADMM with First-order Approximation
Input: Local functions f[1:N ], step penalty ζ .
Initialize x0[1:N ] randomly, λ
0
[1:N ] = 0. Each agent selects a private constant Di.
for k = 0, 1, 2, ...K − 1 do
Agents i = 1 to N do in parallel:
Randomly pick two positive diagonal matrices ρ¯k+1i and Γ
k+1
i such that (N − 1)ρ¯k+1i + Γk+1i = Di · Ip
and update xk+1i in parallel :
xk+1i :=
Γk+1i
Di
xki +
(N − 1)ρ¯k+1i
Di
∑
j,i x
k
j
N − 1
A
− D−1i ∇ fi(xki )B + D
−1
i λ
k
i + ∆
k+1
i . (6)
Exchange xk+1i and then update λ
k+1
i := λ
k
i − ζ
∑
j,i(xk+1j − xk+1i ).
end for
Motivated by [32] we show even under LDP, either for generalized linear functions (Theorem 4.1),
or when ∇ fi is bounded in l1 norm (Theorem 4.2), the utility loss is not explicitly dependent on
(ignoring logarithmic terms) d for arbitrary closed convex constraints C.
2 Algorithm Description and Privacy Analysis
We first present the main protocol of modified private ADMM and GD as Algorithm 1 and 2, respectively.
Here, we omit the projection step if C $ Rd since we are interested in arbitrary constraints. For
simplicity, in this section we assume G is fully connected and only consider the consensus problem
temporarily, while we provide a convergence proof for general cases in the next section. In contrast to
previous private ADMM protocols [38], [42], [43], we consider applying a first-order approximation for
each fi, similar to [50], [51], as
fi(xi) ≈ fi(xki ) + ∇ fi(xki )(xi − xki ), (5)
and we derive Algorithm 1 accordingly. Thus, Algorithm 1 has reduced complexity, same as that of GD,
which avoids solving (4). In this paper, we use ‖·‖q to denote the lq norm and ‖·‖ denotes the standard
l2 norm for brevity. It is clear that Algorithm 1 and 2 share a very similar structure except for the dual
variable λki in ADMM. Intuitively, Term (A) in either (6) or (7) behaves as a random aggregator to
merge the updates from the previous iteration and Part B corresponds to the effect from the function fi
on updating xk+1i . Here, we only give two examples to select the random weights where Term (A) is a
uniformly distributed in some interval. Many variants can be easily derived, and more details can be
found in Appendix E. Clearly, in Algorithms 1 and 2, only the exchange of xki incurs privacy leakage.
Hence, if secure aggregation exists in a decentralized manner, information-theoretic privacy is achievable.
Theorem 2.1 If each node can have secure communication with (N − 1) nodes, ADMM/GD achieves
information-theoretic privacy with no utility compromise via linear secret sharing, when there are at
most (N − 2) colluding nodes, N ≥ 3.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. Though there is no compromise in accuracy, the limitation of
the above theorem is also clear as it only works for bounded colluding agents. Also, there is no guarantee
associated with how much information can be learned from the convergence. Recalling Algorithm 1
and 2, let X = x[0:K][1:N ] denote the outputs across (K + 1) iterations. The definition of LDP for agent i is
formally given as follows.
Definition 1 (((X), δ(X))-LDP) [52], [48]: A decentralized optimization M achieves ((X), δ(X))-
LDP on an output X, if for any two adjacent inputs D = { f1, ..., fi, ..., fN } and D ′ = { f1, ..., fˆi, ..., fN },
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Algorithm 2 Modified Private Decentralized Gradient Descent
Input: Local functions fi and a diminishing sequence {ηk}
Initialize x0[1:N ].
for k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1 do
Agents i = 1 to N do in parallel :
Randomly pick a positive diagonal matrix wk+1i of which the non-zero elements are within (0, 1).
Then, update xk+1i :
xk+1i :=
2wk+1i
N
xkik +
2(Id − wk+1i )
N
xk
iˆk
+
∑
j,ik, iˆk x
k
j
N A
− ηk+1∇ fi
(∑Ni=1 xki
N
)
B
+ ∆k+1i , (7)
where (ik, iˆk) = arg max(j1, j2)
xkj1 − xkj21. Exchange xk+1i .
end for
which differ only in fi and fˆi ∈ Fi,
sup
D,D′
Pr[D |X] ≤ (X)Pr[D ′ |X] + δ(X), (8)
Fi is some set of functions.
When δ(X) = 0 predefined, we term it pure LDP, otherwise we call it relaxed or approximate
LDP, where one may apply a stronger composition theorem for accumulated privacy loss [49]. We
first focus on the pure LDP case. To quantify the privacy loss, we need to introduce a concrete
assumption, sensitivity, to further define Fi. We say Fi with Bq local sensitivity if for any fˆi, fi ∈ Fi,
Bq ≥ supx∈C
 fi(x) − fˆi(x)
q
in lq norm. For example, B∞ captures the case of an ERM whose data set
is bounded in l∞. In the following, we restrict our focus to Fi with B∞ local sensitivity. The following
lemma, whose proof is in Appendix B, provides a semi closed-form of (X).
Lemma 2.1 Algorithm 1 and 2 satisfy (X)-LDP, where
(X) = sup
fi, fˆi ∈Fi
K−1∑k=0
d∑
l=1
log
P
(
xk+1i [l]
 fi, x[0:k][1:N ])
P
(
xk+1i [l]
 fˆi, x[0:k][1:N ])
 , (9)
where xki [l] denotes the lth coordinate of xki ∈ Rd.
Following the Laplace mechanism [53],[54], we assume each coordinate of ∆ki i.i.d. following a Laplace dis-
tribution Lap(0, βk) with probability density P(y) = βk2 e−βk |y |. Thus, either in (7) or (6), P(xk+1i [l]| fi, x[0:k][1:N ])
follows the same Laplace distribution as that of ∆k+1i [l] except the mean of xk+1i [l] is a random variable
uniformly distributed in some interval, denoted by τk+1i [l] (see Term (A) in (6) and (7), respectively).
To bound the accumulated privacy loss, we consider the composition of the loss on each coordinate l
and iteration k, denoted by k+1
l
(X) = sup fi, fˆi
log[P(xk+1i [l]| fi, x[0:k][1:N ]/P(xk+1i [l]| fˆi, x[0:k][1:N ])] . The following
theorem provides an upper bound of k+1
l
(X).
Theorem 2.2 Algorithms 1 and 2 achieve (X) ≤ ∑K−1k=0 ∑dl=1 k+1l (X)-LDP, 1 where
kl (X) ≤ max|t | ≤αkB∞
 log [ ∫
τki [l]
e−βk |xki [l]−x |dx
]
− log
[∫
τki [l]+t
e−βk |xki [l]−x |dx
] , (10)
1One can obtain a stronger composition form in relaxed (, δ)-LDP [49] that Algorithms 1 and 2 achieve
(∑Kk=0∑dl=1 (e k+1l (X )−1) k+1l (X )
e
 k+1
l
(X )
+1
+
√
−2∑Kk=0∑dl=1( k+1l (X))2 log(δ), δ)-LDP, for some δ ∈ (0, 1).
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where αk = D−1i in Algorithm 1 while αk = ηk in Algorithm 2. τ
k
i [l] + t implies uniformly moving
the interval with t. Moreover, for arbitrary X, the right hand of (10) is never bigger than αk βkB∞.
Specifically, when xki [l] belongs to τki [l], it is strictly smaller than αk βkB∞.
As a straightforward corollary of the above theorem, if we fix parameters in Algorithms 1 and 2, then
the local privacy loss is
∑K−1
k=0 dαk+1βk+1B∞, which matches prior results [43], [42], [48]. We include the
proof of the above theorem in Appendix C. To conclude, for each k
l
(X), randomized weights renders a
constant privacy reduction expressed as a conditional expectation, γk
l
= Exki
[k
l
(X)/(αk βkB∞)|x[0:k−1][1:N ] ].
From (10), a longer length of the interval τki [l], denoted by ω, renders a more concentrated mixture
distribution compared to pure Laplace. In the following theorem, whose proof is in Appendix D, we
quantify γk
l
when ω > αkB∞.
Theorem 2.3 When ω > αkB∞,
γkl ≤
1
αk βkB∞
log
{
eαkβkB∞
[
1−2
∫ ω−αkB∞
2
0
∫ ω
0
Φ(x, y)dydx
]
+2
∫ ω−αkB∞
2
0
∫ ω−αkB∞
−αkB∞
Φ(x, y)dydx
}
, (11)
where Φ(x, y) = βk2ω e−βk |x−y | .
In Fig. 1, we show the relationship between γ, ω and β, where temporarily the dependence on l and k
is dropped for brevity and αB∞ is fixed to 0.001. With ω ranging from 0.1 to 1 and β from 2 to 10,
clearly larger ω and β, corresponding to a longer interval length and noise of smaller variance, lead to
better privacy amplification. As a comparison, we also test the proposed schemes and state-of-the-art
approaches on a regularized logistic regression of the Adult dataset, from the UCI machine learning
repository [43]. The performance of existing private ADMM [43] (with increasing penalty), [42], [48]
and Algorithm 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2, where the communication graph G is randomly generated with
N = 10 and |E | = 20. Fig. 2 (a) shows the accuracy in a logarithmic scale, where even with the first-order
approximation, Algorithm 1 has almost the same performance as prior works. Associated privacy loss of
Algorithm 1 is presented in Fig. 2 (b). The worst case in Fig. 2 (b) refers to
∑K−1
k=0 dαk+1βk+1B∞. On
average, we achieve 30% privacy loss reduction. We omit the privacy loss of [48] in Fig. 2 (b) since it is
too loose in this example. We note that the plots of [43], [42] in Fig. 2(b) (and [48]) either require global
sensitivity or smoothness of gradients, while we only assume local sensitivity. Full description and results
of experiments are included in Appendix E. In Appendix E (Fig. D), we also show that the parameter
randomization in Algorithms 1 and 2 does not bring accuracy compromise, which is guaranteed by the
convergence theorems presented in next section.
3 Convergence and Utility Tradeoff Analysis
Starting from this section, we provide convergence analysis of the two proposed decentralized algorithms
and study the asymptotic upper bound of utility loss. We will drop the dependence of privacy parameters
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(, δ) on X since we are concerned with the worst case. We first review some commonly used concepts
in convex optimization. A function f (x) : C → R is L-Lipschitz continuous if for any x, y ∈ C,
| f (x) − f (y)| ≤ L ‖x − y‖. f (x) is m-strongly convex if m ‖x − y‖2 ≤ (x − y)T (∇ f (x) − ∇ f (y)). Further,
we call f (x) M-smooth if ∇ f (x) is M-Lipschitz continuous, i.e., ‖∇ f (x) − ∇ f (y)‖ ≤ M ‖x − y‖ .
We provide convergence proofs of proposed algorithms with different assumptions. When fi(xi) is
mi-strongly convex and
√
Mi-smooth, we describe our construction of Algorithm 1 on ADMM in three
steps to solve (1) in general. First, we show the admissible range of random selection of parameters
which still preserves a deterministic linear convergence rate (Theorem 3.1). Second, to further reduce the
computational overhead, rather than solving equation (4), we propose a first-order based approximation
(Theorem 3.2). In the modified ADMM, the computation in each iteration is simplified to a closed form.
Third, we present the hybrid ADMM version with noise perturbation and a utility-privacy tradeoff
(Theorem 3.3). To solve (1), with random penalties across iterations, the updating procedure of node i
at the (k + 1)th iteration becomes
xk+1i := arg minxi
fi(xi) − λkT
(
Aixi +
∑
j,i
Aj xkj − c
)
+
1
2
Aixi +∑
j,i
Aj xkj − c
2
ρk+1i
+
1
2
xi − xki 2Γk+1i , (12)
and the Lagrangian multiplier is updated accordingly as λk+1 := λk − γk+1i ρk+1i (
∑N
i=1 Aix
k+1
i − c). Here,
λkT = (λk)T and γk+1i ρk+1i = ζ · I is a global constant set up at the beginning and ‖ z‖2G = zTGz. Let
uk+1 = [xk+1[1:N ], λk+1] and u∗ stand for the optimum to (1).
Theorem 3.1 The proposed ADMM converges linearly to u∗ with penalty Di · I = ATi ρk+1i Ai + Γk+1i ,
where Di is a constant, if
α <
2mi
Nρ2(k+1)i,max σ
2
i,max + ρ˘
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
, ρ0 >
N
2α
,Di > max
{
ρk+1i,maxσ
2
i,max,
Nσ2i,max
α
}
, ζ < 2ρ0 − N
α
,
for some positive α, ζ and ρ0. Here ρ˘k+1i,max is the diagonal element of matrix ρ
k+1
i − ρ0 · I with the
maximal absolute value and σi,max is the largest singular value of Ai. More specifically,uk − u∗2
G
≥ (1 + p) uk+1 − u∗2
G
,
for some p > 0, where G = diag(D1 · I, ...,DN · I, ζ · I ). The selection of p is specified in (42) in Appendix
F.
From Theorem 3.1, it is noted that both ρk[1:N ] and Γ
k
[1:N ] are not necessarily constant. When Di is
sufficiently large and ζ is sufficiently small, which indicates that the step sizes of both primal variable
xi and dual variable λ are small enough, ρk[1:N ] can be independently and randomly selected from an
interval centered at some point ρ0 · I and Γk+1i = Di · I − ATi ρk+1i Ai. However, with (12), we may encounter
considerable computation overhead in each iteration when no closed-form optima exists. Substituting
(5) into (12), xk+1i can then be approximated in a closed-form of x
k
[1:N ] and λ
k ,
xk+1i := D
−1
i
[
ATi
(
λk − ρk+1i
(∑
j,i
Aj xkj − c
) )
+ Γk+1i x
k
i − ∇ fi(xki )
]
. (13)
To quantify the loss from the approximation, we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 First-order approximation based ADMM, with modified updating procedure (13) still
enjoys the linear convergence rate with proper penalty selection specified in (48) in Appendix G.
Now, we further consider the perturbation version of (13) with noise: the only difference is that an
independent noise ∆ki is added at the end of the updating procedure as shown in (6).
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Theorem 3.3 With the same assumptions as Theorem 3.2, if the updating procedure further perturbs
with an independent noise ∆k+1i , defined in (6) in Algorithm 1, there exists a constant a ∈ (0, 1) and
residual Rk such that uk − u∗2
G
≤ ak u0 − u∗2
G
+ Rk, (14)
where the expression of a and Rk can be found in Appendix H. 2 With a total  LDP budget, E
uk − u∗2 =
O˜( d3NB2∞
2
) and under relaxed (, δ)-LDP, this bound is sharpened to O˜( d2NB2∞
2
), where we ignore other
constants with respect to Ai and fi. Here O˜ is the big-O that ignores logarithmic factors.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 can be found in Appendix H. In the general convex case, we take GD as an
example. In comparison to ADMM, GD only captures consensus optimization. When ‖∇ fi ‖ is bounded,
the following theorem shows the privacy-utility tradeoff of Algorithm 2, with proof in Appendix I. Here
we assume x∗ is the optimum to (1) in the consensus case.
Theorem 3.4 Assume that fi(x) is convex and ‖∇ fi(x)‖2 is bounded by G2 for each i. Moreover, let
V2 = maxi,k E(∆ki /ηk)2. When we select the step size ηk = 1c√k for some constant c, then
N∑
i=1
fi(x˜K−1) −
N∑
i=1
fi(x∗) ≤
c
√
K
∑N
i=1
x0i − x∗2 + Nc−1(logK + 2)√K + 1(G2 + V2)
K
,
where x˜K−1 = 1K
∑K−1
k=0 x¯
k and x¯k = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
k
i . In -LDP, Algorithm 2 has utility loss O˜
(√∑N
i=1‖x0i −x∗‖2)√N (G+ d3/2KB∞ )√
K
)
.
With (, δ) relaxation, this bound can be sharpened to O˜
(√∑N
i=1‖x0i −x∗‖2√NdB∞

)
when K is sufficiently
large.
4 Utility Loss under LDP in High-dimensional Optimization
Over the last decade, a rich line of work has been devoted to studying and even breaking the curse
of dimensionality in DP. On the negative side, Smith et al. in [10] have shown that even for linear
regression with samples bounded in l2 norm, utility loss has a polynomial dependence on d generally
speaking. However, the remarkable work by Talwar et al. [55] and follow-up works [33],[56],[35] show
that such dependence can be captured by the Gaussian width of the constraint C being optimized
over. In particular, the Gaussian width over an l1 ball scales logarithmically in d and in [11], a nearly-
optimal private Frank-Wolfe algorithm is established to solve LASSO. In addition, some data-dependent
assumption or privacy concerns can also help [31], [57], [58], [59]. Such evidence provides us confidence
that under certain sparsity, even LDP is possible in high-dimensional cases. Although the required loss
with respect to the constraint C, i.e., the domain of xi, is fairly well understood, we are interested in
whether the structure of fi(·) can also help. Under a central model, positive results have been shown for
generalized linear functions based on objective/output perturbation [32]. In such a setup, for simplicity,
we assume fi(xi) = 1bi
∑bi
j=1 φ(〈zij, xi〉, lij ), xi ∈ C, where (zij, lij ) ∈ Rd × R, j ∈ [1 : bi], are data points held
by agent i and φ(·, ·) is a convex function R × R→ R. Here, we still focus on the consensus optimization,
i.e., xi = x j , and thus this formulation captures a supervised learning of a linear predictor. For those data
points, if zij in l2 norm is bounded by C2 for i ∈ [1 : N] and j ∈ [1 : bi], then the sensitivity can also be
reasonably bounded in l2 norm by B2. Under such an assumption, we show under LDP, dimensionality
independent loss can be derived for generalized linear functions by applying Algorithm 2 on fi(·). The
main idea we use here is to control the error from the Lipschitz assumption of fi(·) rather than analyzing
the divergence
xki − x∗ directly as before.The proof of the following theorem is in Appendix J.
2In particular, when limk→∞ ∆ki → 0 for each i, i.e., a diminishing noise is utilized, limk→∞ Rk → 0.
8
Theorem 4.1 For fi(xi) defined in the generalized linear form above, we assume φ(·, ·) is an L-Lipschitz
continuous function, which is m-strongly convex and M-smooth. For Algorithm 2 to achieve (, δ)-
LDP budget, the utility loss
∑N
i=1 fi(x¯K ) −
∑N
i=1 fi(x∗) can be independent of d and upper bounded by
O˜
(√MNC2LB2
m3/2
)
.
In general, beyond the generalized linear assumption, as an analog to the case where the constraint
C is l1 bounded, it is natural to consider whether the utility loss can be also expressed in a form ‖∇ fi ‖1
and with a logarithmic dependence on d. In the following, we answer this question affirmatively. We
prove the following result in Appendix K.
Theorem 4.2 If fi(xi) is m-strongly convex and M smooth, of which ‖∇ fi(xi)‖1 ≤ C1, with sensitivity
B1, the utility loss
∑N
i=1 fi(x¯K ) −
∑N
i=1 fi(x∗) is logarithmically dependent on d and upper bounded by
O˜
(√MNC1B1
m3/2
)
for (, δ)-LDP.
As a final remark, it is noted that all the convergence analyses presented in this paper do not rely on any
assumption on the constraint domain C but depend on the initialization x0i , where in particular for the
strongly convex case, the utility loss scales logarithmically with fi(x0i ) − fi(x∗). In addition, we present a
privacy analysis of a variant of SGD: random coordinate descent (RCD) [60]. The difference between
RCD and GD is that in each iteration, gradient descent is implemented only on one dimension randomly
selected and thus complexity is reduced by 1/d. In practice, many functions fi(·) may have a much
smaller coordinate smooth constant Mˆ, which is defined as maxl,x∈C |∇ f (x + tel)[l] − ∇ f (x)[l]| < Mˆ |t |
for l ∈ [1 : d] and el is the lth standard basis of Rd. It is not hard to observe that 1 ≤ M/Mˆ ≤ d. Details
about private RCD can be found in Appendix K.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate LDP in interactive decentralized optimization from both asymptotic and
non-asymptotic viewpoints. A framework to incorporate randomized parameters is proposed, which
can reduce the privacy loss by a constant while preserving the convergence rate. Simulation results are
provided to validate the theory. Theoretically, we study asymptotic utility loss with sensitivity in l∞, l2
and l1 norms. Without resort to any sparse assumptions on the constraint C, we find that even under
LDP, utility loss may not explicitly depend on dimensionality d when the objective functions are in good
structures, analogous to existing study on DP in constrained optimization.
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A Private Decentralized Optimization with Secret Sharing
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 2.1. We first give the details of the algorithm construction,
where the main idea is to securely compute the sum of exchanged updates via secret sharing. Without
loss of generality, we take the ADMM algorithm defined in (4) as an example and the modified protocol
is presented as below. An illustration is presented as Fig. (A). In Algorithm 3, due to the linear
Algorithm 3 Aixki Exchange in Secret-sharing based ADMM
Input: Aixki , i = 1, 2, ..., N, p ∈ Z
Agents i = 1, 2, ..., N do in parallel:
vi randomly splits Aixki into N shares, s
k
[1:N ], such that
Aixki =
N∑
j=1
ski j mod p.
vi sends ski j to node vj while keeping s
k
ii as a secret.
Agents i = 1, 2, ..., N do in parallel:
vi sums up sk[1:N ] received as
sˆki =
N∑
j=1
skji mod p.
vi broadcasts sˆki
Reconstruct
∑N
i=1 Aix
k
i =
∑N
i=1 sˆ
k
i mod p
2
V
3
V
1
V
2
V
3
V
1
V

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Fig. (A) Secret-sharing based Exchange Protocol
constraint assumption, the procedure to update both xi and λ only relies on the sum of Aixk+1i . Assume
that in the k-th iteration, each participant has updated the states to xki . Let p be a sufficiently large
integer preselected such that p > ‖∑Ni=1 Aixi ‖∞, i.e., p is greater than the largest coordinate of ∑Ni=1 Aixi
in absolute value. To share Aixki with neighbors, rather than exchanging directly, node i randomly
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divides Aixki into N shares, {ski[1:N ]}, such that
∑N
j=1 s
k
i j = Aix
k
i . Such division can be performed by
randomly selecting sk
i[2:N ], and then s
k
i1 is determined by Aix
k
i −
∑N
j=2 s
k
i j . Then, vi sends the share s
k
i j to
vj , j = [1 : N]\i, while keeping skii to itself. After the exchange, each node vi still holds N shares, sk[1:N ]i,
of which one is from itself and the remaining are from the other (N − 1) neighbors. Then, each vi sums
up all the shares held, denoted by sˆki =
∑N
j=1 s
k
ji and broadcasts. Clearly,
N∑
i=1
sˆki ≡
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
skji ≡
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ski j ≡
N∑
i=1
Aixki mod p. (15)
Moreover, xki can be reconstructed if and only if s
k
i[1:N ] are all collected. For no more than (N − 2)
colluding nodes, there always exists one share among sk
i[1:N ] which cannot be inferred by any vj , j , i
and thus the scheme proposed is information theoretically secure. Especially, if we are concerned with a
network adversary that can eavesdrop on all communication, we need to provide secure communication
channels between each pair of nodes. A given pair of nodes vi and vj can encrypt shares ski j and s
k
ji
using a shared symmetric key prior to exchange. An example is given as Fig. A (b) (in a relay fashion),
where we denote the ciphertext of ski j by (ski j). Relying on secret sharing, the proposed ADMM achieves
privacy without any compromise in utility, while it comes with an additional round of data exchange in
each iteration.
A rigorous proof is given as follows. Considering Ai0 xki0 for arbitrary i0 ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, based on the
definition of secret splitting, one may reconstruct Ai0 xi0 if and only all the N shares have been collected
(and decrypted properly in the encryption case). In the first step of Algorithm 3, where (N − 1) random
shares have been distributed to the remaining (N − 1) nodes, there should exist at least one honest node,
denoted by vi1 with shares ski0i1 . Then, in the second step, each node sums up all the shares received as
sˆk[1:N ] and broadcasts. It is clear that
sˆki0 =
N∑
j=1
skji0 mod p,
of which the reconstruction requires both ski1i0 and s
k
i0i0
, while ski0i0 is a secret of vi0 and s
k
i1i0
is a secret
between vi1 and vi0 . With the assumption that vi1 is honest, for vi, i , i1, i0, from sˆi0 , it is impossible
to infer either ski1i0 or s
k
i0i0
. With a similar reasoning, since N ≥ 3, the reconstruction of sˆki0 is also
determined by some skii0 for i , i0, i1, which is unknown to vi1 . Thus, vi1 cannot infer s
k
i0i0
either. In a
nutshell, either for vi, i , i1, i0 or vi1 , at least one share, i.e., ski0i0 , cannot be inferred and thus Ai0 x
k
i0
is
secure to at most (N − 2) colluding nodes.
B Proof of Lemma 2.1
It is noted that for an X = x[0:K][1:N ] observed, since there is no prior on the inputs D = { f1, ..., fi, ..., fN }
and D ′ = { f1, ..., fˆi, ..., fN },
P
(
D
x[0:K][1:N ])
P
(
D ′
x[0:K][1:N ]) =
P
(
x[0:K][1:N ]
D )
P
(
x[0:K][1:N ]
D ′) = P
(
x0[1:N ]
D ) ∏Kk=1 P (xk[1:N ]D, x[0:k−1][1:N ] )
P
(
x0[1:N ]
D ′) ∏Kk=1 P (xk[1:N ]D ′, x[0:k−1][1:N ] ) , (16)
It is noted that D and D ′ differ in fi and fˆi, to which the distribution of x[1:N ]\i is invariant, and xki
only depends on the private function of agent i and x[1:k−1][1:N ] . On the other hand, the initialization of
x0[1:N ] is independent of the dataset. Thus, (16) can be further simplified as
K−1∏
k=0
P
(
xk+1i
 fi, x[0:k][1:N ])
P
(
xk+1i
 fˆi, x[0:k][1:N ]) =
K−1∏
k=0
d∏
l=1
P
(
xk+1i [l]
 fi, x[0:k][1:N ])
P
(
xk+1i [l]
 fˆi, x[0:k][1:N ]) ,
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since the noise on each dimension is i.i.d. By taking the logarithm of the above equation and recalling
the definition of (X) in Definition 1, the lemma follows.
C Proof of Theorem 2.2
When we assume ∆k+1i is a Laplace distribution, the distributions P(xk+1i [ j]| fi, x[0:k][1:N ]) in either Algorithm
1 or 2 share a very similar structure. Both follow a mixture Laplace distribution with a random mean.
In Algorithm 1 the mean is randomly distributed in an interval starting from xki − D−1i ∇ fi(xki ) + D−1i λki
to
∑
j,i x
k
j
N−1 − D−1i ∇ fi(xki ) + D−1i λki , while in Algorithm 2 the mean is randomly distributed in an interval
starting from 2N x
k
ik
+
∑
j,ik , iˆk
xkj
N − ηk+1∇ fi(
∑N
i=1 x
k
i
N ) to 2N xkiˆk +
∑
j,ik , iˆk
xkj
N − ηk+1∇ fi(
∑N
i=1 x
k
i
N ). Without loss
of generality, we focus on Algorithm 1. Since ∆k+1i on each dimension is i.i.d. in Lap(0, βk+1), recalling
Lemma 2.1, at iteration k + 1, the bound on privacy loss in the l-th dimension can be expressed as
ˆk+1l (X) = sup
fˆi ∈Fi
 log P (xk+1i [l] fi, x[0:k][1:N ])
P
(
xk+1i [l]
 fˆi, x[0:k][1:N ])
 = max|t | ≤D−1i B∞
 log
∫
τk+1i [l]
e−βk+1 |x
k+1
i [l]−Y |dY∫
τk+1i [l]+t
e−βk+1 |x
k+1
i [l]−Y |dY
. (17)
We reformulate this problem as follows. For X ∈ R, we consider
max
|t | ≤D−1i B∞
 log ∫ ω0 βk+1e−βk+1 |X−Y |dY∫ t+ω
t
βk+1e−βk+1 |X−Y |dY
, (18)
for some positive numbers ω, βk+1 and B∞. Here, ω corresponds to the length of the interval.
For a fixed t, |t | ≤ B∞, if X < [0, ω] ∪ [t, ω + t], then log ∫ ω0 βk+1e−βk+1 |X−Y |dY∫ t+ω
t
βk+1e−βk+1 |X−Y |dY
 =  log ∫ ω0 e−βk+1 |X−Y |dYeβk+1t ∫ ω
0
e−βk+1 |X−Y |dY
 = βk+1t ≤ D−1i βk+1B∞.
In the following, without loss of generality, we assume X ∈ [0, ω], then
∫ ω
0
βk+1e−βk+1 |X−Y |dY = 2−e−βk+1X−
e−βk+1(ω−X). First, supposing that X ∈ [t, ω+t], then
∫ ω+t
t
βk+1e−βk+1 |X−Y |dY = 2−e−βk+1(X−t)−e−βk+1(ω+t−X).
To show
e−βk+1 |t | ≤ 2 − e
−βk+1X − e−βk+1(ω−X)
2 − e−βk+1(X−t) − e−βk+1(ω+t−X) ≤ e
βk+1 |t |,
it is equivalent to showing{
2eβk+1 |t | − e−βk+1X+βk+1 |t | − e−βk+1(ω−X)+βk+1 |t | ≥ 2 − e−βk+1(X−t) − e−βk+1(ω+t−X),
2 − e−βk+1X − e−βk+1(ω−X) ≤ 2eβk+1 |t | − e−βk+1(X−t)+βk+1 |t | − e−βk+1(ω+t−X)+βk+1 |t | .
(19)
Due to the symmetry, we merely prove the case that when t ≥ 0, where (19) can be rewritten as,{
2eβk+1t − e−βk+1(X−t) − e−βk+1(ω−X−t) ≥ 2 − e−βk+1(X−t) − e−βk+1(ω+t−X),
2 − e−βk+1X − e−βk+1(ω−X) ≤ 2eβk+1t − e−βk+1(X−2t) − e−βk+1(ω−X).
(20)
Clearly, for the first inequality, it suffices to show
2(eβk+1t − 1) ≥ (e2βk+1t − 1)e−βk+1(ω+t−X), (21)
and it can be further simplified as 2eβk+1(ω+t−X) ≥ eβk+1t + 1. Such a claim follows clearly as ω − X ≥ 0
and α > 0. For the second inequality, with similar reasoning, it is equivalent to
2eβk+1X ≥ eβk+1t + 1, (22)
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which holds since X ≥ t. At last, we consider X < [t, t + ω]. Still, due to the symmetry, we can assume
t > 0 and X < t. Then, it is equivalent to show:{
2eβk+1t − e−βk+1(X−t) − e−βk+1(ω−X)+βk+1t ≥ e−βk+1(t−X) − e−βk+1(ω+t−X),
2 − e−βk+1X − e−βk+1(ω−X) ≤ eβk+1X − e−βk+1(ω−X).
(23)
As for the first inequality, assume that g(t) = 2eβk+1t − e−βk+1(X−t) − e−βk+1(t−X) − e−βk+1(ω−X)+βk+1t +
e−βk+1(ω+t−X). It is noted that when t = 0, x should be also be 0 based on the assumption and g(0) = 0.
On the other hand,
dg
dt
= βk+1
(
2eβk+1t − e−βk+1(X−t) + e−βk+1(t−X) − e−βk+1(ω−X)+βk+1t − e−βk+1(ω+t−X)) . (24)
Since X < ω, to show g(t) is non-decreasing with respect to t, it suffices to show that,
2eβk+1t − e−βk+1(X−t) + e−βk+1(t−X) − e−βk+1(t−X)+βk+1t − e−βk+1(t+t−X) ≥ 0.
It is clear that eβk+1t ≥ e−βk+1(X−t) and e−βk+1(t−X) ≥ e−βk+1(2t−X) as both X and t are non-negative.
Furthermore, eβk+1t ≥ e−βk+1(t−X)+βk+1t = eβk+1X since t ≥ X. Therefore, (24) is non-negative. The second
inequality of (23) is exactly the AM-GM inequality that
2 ≤ e−βk+1X + eβk+1X .
In a nutshell, we have proven that (18) is upper bounded by max |t | ≤D−1i B∞ |tβk+1 | = βk+1D−1i B∞.
Moreover, when X belongs to the intersection of the two intervals, (0, ω) and (t, ω + t), the above
inequalities are strict, i.e., (18) is strictly smaller than βk+1D−1i B∞, which is the case if we fix all
parameters to be constants. Similarly, by replacing D−1i with ηk+1, we derive the proof for the case of
Algorithm 2.
D Proof of Theorem 2.3
We drop all the dependence on i, k and l for brevity. Following the normalization in the proof of
Theorem 2.1, we still assume x is a Laplace distribution of which the mean is uniformly distributed in
[0, ω], conditional on all prior intermediate outputs. As the corollary of Theorem 2.1,
Θ(x) = max
|t | ≤αB∞
 log ∫ ω0 e−β |x−y |dy∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−y |dy
,
where the maximization is achieved when t either equals to αB∞ or −αB∞. To quantify γ, it suffices to
calculate ∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ω
0
Θ(x) β
2ω
e−β |x−y |dydx, (25)
since the probability density function of x is
∫ ω
0
β
2ω e
−β |x−y |dy. With the concavity of log(·), (25) is upper
bounded by
log
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ω
0
max
t=±αB∞
{ ∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz
,
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz
}
β
2ω
e−β |x−y |dxdy. (26)
Now we take a closer look into maxt=±αB∞
{ ∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz
,
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz
}
. Still from the corollary of
Theorem 2.1, once xk+1 < [0, ω], maxt=±αB∞
{ ∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz
,
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz
}
= eαβB∞ .
Since we assume ω > αB∞, it is not hard to observe that
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• x ∈ [0, ω−αB∞2 ], maxt=±αB∞
{ ∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz
,
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz
}
=
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz

t=−αB∞
;
• x ∈ [ω−αB∞2 , ω2 ], maxt=±αB∞
{ ∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz
,
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz
}
=
∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz

t=−αB∞
;
• x ∈ [ω2 , ω+αB∞2 ], maxt=±αB∞
{ ∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz
,
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz
}
=
∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz

t=αB∞
;
• x ∈ [ω+αB∞2 , ω], maxt=±αB∞
{ ∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz
,
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz
}
=
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−z |dz∫ ω
0
e−β |x−z |dz

t=αB∞
.
Thus, fortunately, we can avoid the complicated integral at least in x ∈ [0, ω2 − αB∞], or x ∈ [ω2 +
αB∞, ω] where it is simplified to O(
∫ ω+t
t
e−β |x−y |dy). Now we can split R into three parts, (−∞, 0) ∪
(ω,∞), [0, ω−αB∞2 ] ∪ [ω+αB∞2 , ω] and the rest (ω−αB∞2 , ω+αB∞2 ). To avoid the tedious term when x ∈
(ω−αB∞2 , ω+αB∞2 ), we simply use the global upper bound to simplify them to derive a closed-form
expression but one may obtain the expression of γ exactly with the same reasoning. Note the symmetry
on t = ±αB∞, (26) is upper bounded by
log
{
eωαB∞
[
1 − 2
∫ (ω−αB∞)/2
0
∫ ω
0
β
2ω
e−β |x−y |dydx
]
+ 2
∫ (ω−αB∞)/2
0
∫ ω−αB∞
−αB∞
β
2ω
e−β |x−y |dydx
}
. (27)
E Simulation Results
We test the proposed schemes and state-of-art approaches on regularized empirical risk minimization
(ERM) tasks. We use the standard Adult dataset from the UCI Machine Learning Repository. For
simplicity, we call the task as UCI in the following. In UCI, the dataset consists of demographic records,
including age, sex and income etc. in 15 total features. We try to predict whether the annual income of
an individual is above 50k. After processing of the data, we remove all individuals with missing values
and normalize both columns (features) and rows (individuals) while converting labels {≥ 50k, < 50k} to
{0, 1}. The training samples are denoted by {zij ∈ R14,L ij ∈ {0, 1}|i = 1, · · · , N, j = 1, · · · , bi}. Consistent
with [43], [42], we select L (x) = log(1+exp(−x)). Thus, N agents are collaboratively solving the following
logistic regression:
min
x
N∑
i=1
fi(x) =
N∑
i=1
(
1
bi
bi∑
j=1
log(1 + exp(−L ij xT zij)) +
1
2
‖x‖2
)
.
UCI is run with different parameter settings. 10 independent runs of each algorithm for comparison
are performed and each agent is randomly assigned 100 samples from the dataset. In each run, the
communication graph is randomly generated using the given N and the number of edges |E |.
In UCI, four examples (a), (b), (c) and (d) are provided. We uniformly assume that Di = D = 10
and ζ = 0.5 in all cases for Algorithm 1. In the case of private ADMM, previous works all assume
fixed parameters in the optimization protocol. In [42], the Lagrangian multiplier at the beginning of
each iteration is perturbed, while [48] considers the output perturbation at the end of each iteration.
Further, in [43], the authors introduce a sequence of increasing step penalty, which can bring better
utility-privacy tradeoff empirically. For [42], [48] with constant fixed penalty, we assume Γi = 0.5D and
ρi =
0.5D
|Ni | , corresponding to the expectation of the penalty terms in Algorithm 1. Here Ni denotes the
neighbors of agent i. As for [43], we follow their setting that Γki = 0.5 × 1.02k |Ni | and ρki = 0.5 × 1.02k . 3
3We do not optimize the increasing penalty here but we find that in some cases by proper selection, a privacy loss
reduction can be achieved empirically at a cost of relatively small utility compromise. Such techniques can also be applied
in our algorithms.
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In the privacy part, with the same assumption in [43], we assume fi and fˆi may only differ in one
sample and thus, due the normalization, B∞ = 1bi = 0.01, and J =
2.8
DBi
, the Jacobian constant required
by [43] in their privacy analysis. It is noted that derivative of L is within (−1, 0], while the privacy
analysis of [48] requires a global sensitivity on that of ∇L . This makes their bound in this example
too loose and we omit their privacy loss bound in our simulation. Following the setting of [43], [48], we
also use a diminishing noise by selecting βk = 1.02k . The results of Example (a) are illustrated in Fig.
2, where N = 10, |E | = 20. The accuracy logarithm defined by log (xki − x∗i )/d, across 100 iterations
averaged across 10 runs. The difference between the best and the worst accuracy over 100 runs is also
marked. In example (b), with illustration shown in Fig. (B), under the same setting, we test algorithms
in a large-scale case where N = 100, |E | = 200.
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Fig. (B) N = 100, E = 200
In Example (c), we present an interesting variant to Algorithm 2. With Theorem 2.3, it is clear
that under our framework, a larger interval can produce a better privacy amplification. Instead of the
construction in Algorithm 2, one can construct a random aggregator by more aggressively utilizing
the divergence among xk[1:N ]. For an instance, let N˜i denote the neighbors of node i including i. To
aggregate xk
j∈Ni , for each dimension l ∈ [1 : d], let
αki,min = min
j∈N˜i
xkj [l], and αki,max = max
j∈N˜i
xkj [l].
We consider the updating subroutine (28) in Algorithm 2*, i.e., each coordinate of xk+1i [l] is uniformly
selected between the largest maxj∈N˜i x
k
j [l] and the smallest minj∈N˜i xkj [l].
Different from Algorithm 1 and 2 which are controllable, aggregation in Algorithm 2* will bring
some compromise in convergence. Following [45], we also select a diminishing step size, where for [45],
ηk = 0.9
k and in Algorithm 2*, ηk = 0.93k for balance. Not surprisingly, Algorithm 2* has a worse
convergence at the beginning since information from neighbors is less efficiently merged but finally [45]
and Algorithm 2* achieve almost the same utility loss. However, the privacy loss of Algorithm 2* is only
30% of [45], as shown in Fig (C). Since Algorithm 1 applies a constant step size, it has better accuracy
but worse privacy loss, where all noises are fixed to be βk = 1.02k .
Finally, we provide the performance of non-private optimization in UCI. With the same parameter
setting as before, we test Algorithm 1 without first-order approximation and conventional ADMM with
fixed parameters. In addition, we set the step size ηk = 0.95k and test Algorithm 2 and conventional
decentralized GD (DGD) with fixed parameters. The performance is illustrated in Fig. D. In Fig. (D-1),
the graph is randomly generated with N = 10 and |E | = 20, same as Example (a) in Fig. 2; while in Fig.
(D-2), N = 100 and |E | = 200, same as Example (b).
From Fig. D, it is clear, randomization defined in Algorithm 1 and 2 does not incur accuracy loss,
which is consistent with our analysis.
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Algorithm 2*
Input: Local functions fi and a diminishing sequence {ηk}
Initialize x0[1:N ].
for k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1 do
Agents i = 1 to N do in parallel :
for l = 1, 2, ..., d do
Randomly and independently generating a weight w within (0, 1) and then updating xk+1i [l]:
xk+1i [l] := w · αki,min + (1 − w) · αki,max − ηk+1∇ fi(xki ) + ∆k+1i [l]. (28)
Exchange xk+1i with Neighbors
end for
end for
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F Proof of Theorem 3.1
Since the proximal term
xi − xki 2Γk+1i is required to be nonnegative, the matrix Γk+1i should be positive def-
inite. With Di ·I = ATi ρk+1i Ai+Γk+1i , we just need to guarantee that the Di satisfy Di−σmax(ATi ρk+1i Ai) > 0
where σmax(Z) and σmin(Z) denote the maximal and the minimal non-zero singular value of Z, respec-
tively. It leads to Di > ρk+1i,maxσ
2
i,max where σi,max is the largest singular value of Ai and ρ
k+1
i,max is the
maximum diagonal element of ρk+1i .
To show the linear convergence, it suffices to determine p > 0 such that,uk − u∗2 ≥ (1 + p) uk+1 − u∗2 , (29)
which can be reformulated as uk − u∗2 − uk+1 − u∗2 ≥ p uk+1 − u∗2 . (30)
With the strong convexity,
〈x − y,∇ fi(x) − ∇ fi(y)〉 ≥ mi ‖x − y‖2 . (31)
And from (12), we have
∇ fi(xk+1i ) = ATi (λk − ρk+1i (Aixk+1i +
∑
j,i
Aj xkj − c)) + Γk+1i (xki − xk+1i ). (32)
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Fig. (D-2) N = 100, |E | = 200
Also from the KKT condition, for the optimal states λ∗ and x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x∗N )
∇ fi(x∗i ) = ATi λ∗,
N∑
i=1
Aix∗i = c. (33)
Substituting the above equations into (31)
(xk+1i −x∗i )T (ATi (λk−λ∗)−ATi ρk+1i (Ai(xk+1i −xki )+
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj −x∗j ))+Γk+1i (xki −xk+1i )) ≥ mi
xk+1i − x∗i 2 . (34)
Summing up all for each i, it is noted that
∑N
i=1 Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ) = 1ζ (λk − λk+1) and
(uk+1 − u∗)TG(uk − uk+1) = 1
ζ
(λk+1 − λ∗)T (λk − λk+1) +
N∑
i=1
(xk+1i − x∗i )T (ATi ρk+1i Ai + Γk+1i )(xki − xk+1i )
≥ −1
ζ
λk − λk+12 + N∑
i=1
mi
xk+1i − x∗i 2 + ( N∑
i=1
ρk+1i Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ))T (
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j )).
(35)
Here, let the matrix G = diag({D1, ...,DN, 1ζ }), where Di = Di · I , then it suffices to show
uk − u∗2
G
−uk+1 − u∗2
G
≥ p uk+1 − u∗2
G
. On the other hand,
uk − u∗2
G
− uk+1 − u∗2
G
= 2(uk+1 − u∗)TG(uk −
uk+1) + uk − uk+12
G
. Referring to (35), it is equivalent to figure out p such that,
2
N∑
i=1
mi
xk+1i − x∗i 2 + 2( N∑
i=1
ρk+1i Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ))T (
N∑
i=1
Ai(xki − x∗i )) +
N∑
i=1
Di
xk+1i − xki 2 − 1ζ λk+1 − λk2
≥ p(
N∑
i=1
Di
xk+1i − x∗i 2 + 1ζ λk+1 − λ∗2).
(36)
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From (32) and with the fact that xki − x∗i = xki − xk+1i + xk+1i − x∗i , we getλk+1 − λ∗2 ≤ 1
σ2i,min
ATi (λk+1 − λ∗)2
=
1
σ2i,min
∇ fi(xk+1i ) − ∇ fi(x∗i ) − ATi (λk − λk+1) − Di(xki − xk+1i ) + ATi ρk+1i N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j )
2
≤ 5
σ2i,min
(Mi
xk+1i − x∗i 2 + σ2i,max λk − λk+12 + D2i xki − xk+1i 2 +
ρ
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
 N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − xk+1j )
2 + ρ2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max N∑
j=1
Aj(xk+1j − x∗j )
2),
(37)
where σi,min is the smallest nonzero singular value of Ai. For simplicity, ρ
2(k+1)
i,max = (ρk+1i,max)2. Now, we
substitute (37) to (36), and then it can be reformulated as∑
i
(2mi − 5Mip
ζNσ2i,min
− Dip)
xk+1i − x∗i 2 +∑
i
(Di −
5pD2i
ζNσ2i,min
) xki − xk+1i 2
− (1
ζ
+
5p
ζN
N∑
i=1
σ2i,max
σ2i,min
) λk − λk+12 + 2( N∑
i=1
ρk+1i Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ))T (
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ))
− 5p
ζN
N∑
i=1
ρ
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
σ2i,min
( N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − xk+1j )
2 + 1ζ2 λk − λk+12 ) ≥ 0.
(38)
Moreover, 2(∑Ni=1 ρk+1i Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ))T (∑Nj=1 Aj(xkj − x∗j )) can be rewritten as
2(
N∑
i=1
ρk+1i Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ))T (
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ))
=2(
N∑
i=1
ρk+1i Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ))T (
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − xk+1j )) +
2
ζ2
(λk − λk+1)T ρ0(λk − λk+1)+
2
ζ
(
N∑
i=1
(ρk+1i − ρ0)Ai(xk+1i − x∗i ))T (λk − λk+1)
≥ 2ρ
0
ζ2
λk − λk+12 − N∑
i=1
αNρ2(k+1)i,max σ
2
i,max
xk+1i − x∗i 2 − N∑
i=1
Nσ2i,max
α
xki − xk+1i 2 −
N∑
i=1
αρ˘
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
xk+1i − x∗i 2 − Nαζ2 λk − λk+12 ,
(39)
where ρ0 = ρ0 · I and ρ˘k+1i,max is the maximum diagonal element of matrix ρk+1i − ρ0. Further, we have
the following AM-GM inequality N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − xk+1j )
2 ≤ N N∑
j=1
σ2j,max
xkj − xk+1j 2. (40)
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Combining (29), (30) and (31), we find that it suffices to find out p such that
N∑
i=1
(
2mi − 5Mip
ζNσ2i,min
− Dip − αNρ2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max − αρ˘2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max
) xk+1i − x∗i 2 +
N∑
i=1
(
Di −
Nσ2i,max
α
− 5pD
2
i
ζNσ2i,min
−
5pσ2i,max
ζ
N∑
j=1
ρ
2(k+1)
j,max σ
2
j,max
σ2j,min
) xki − xk+1i 2 +(
2ρ0
ζ2
− N
αζ2
− 1
ζ
− 5p
ζ
N∑
i=1
(
ρ
2(k+1)
i,max
ζ2
+
1
N
)
σ2i,max
σ2i,min
) λk − λk+12 ≥ 0.
(41)
Therefore, p can be selected as
min
{
2mi − αNρ2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max − αρ˘2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max
5Mi
ζNσ2i,min
+ Di
,
Di − Nσ
2
i,max
α
5D2i
ζNσ2i,min
+
5σ2i,max
ζ
∑N
j=1
ρ
2(k+1)
j,maxσ
2
j,max
σ2j,min
,
2ρ0
ζ − Nαζ − 1
5
∑N
i=1(
ρ
2(k+1)
i,max
ζ2
+ 1N )
σ2i,max
σ2i,min
}
.
(42)
To guarantee that p > 0, the parameters α, Di, ρ0 and ζ should satisfy:
α <
2mi
Nρ2(k+1)i,max σ
2
i,max + ρ˘
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
,
Di > max{ρk+1i,maxσ2i,max,
Nσ2i,max
α
},
ρ0 >
N
2α
,
ζ < 2ρ0 − N
α
.
(43)
G Proof of Theorem 3.2
Under the strong continuity of both fi and its gradient ∇ fi, for any x and y,
‖∇ fi(x) − ∇ fi(y)‖2 ≤ Mi ‖x − y‖2 ,
and we use the following fact, for any z
fi(x) − fi(y) ≤ ∇ f Ti (z)(x − y) +
Mi
2
‖x − z‖2 ,
and with strong convexity we have
mi
2
xk+1i − x∗i 2 + ∇ fi(x∗i )T (xk+1i − x∗i ) ≤ fi(xk+1i ) − fi(x∗i ) ≤ ∇ f Ti (xki )(xk+1i − x∗i ) + Mi2 xki − xk+1i 2 .
(44)
On the other hand, since ATi λ
∗ = ∇ fi(x∗i ), thus
mi
2
xk+1i − x∗i 2 ≤ (xk+1i − x∗i )T (∇ f (xki ) − ATi λ∗) + Mi2 xki − xk+1i 2 .
Recalling (13) that ∇ fi(xki ) = ATi (λk − ρk+1i (Aixk+1i +
∑
j,i Aj xkj − c)) + Γk+1i (xki − xk+1i ), we have the
following,
mi
2
xk+1i − x∗i 2 ≤ (xk+1i − x∗i )T (ATi (λk − λ∗) − ATi ρk+1i N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ) + Di(xki − xk+1i )) +
Mi
2
xki − xk+1i 2 .
(45)
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Due to the approximation, we have a different bound as
λk+1 − λ∗2 ≤ 1
σ2i,min
∇ fi(xki ) − ∇ fi(x∗i ) − ATi (λk − λk+1) − Di(xki − xk+1i ) + ATi ρk+1i N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j )
2
(a)≤ 5
σ2i,min
(2Mi
xk+1i − x∗i 2 + σ2i,max λk − λk+12 + (D2i + 2Mi) xki − xk+1i 2 +
ρ
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
 N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − xk+1j )
2 + ρ2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max N∑
j=1
Aj(xk+1j − x∗j )
2),
(46)
where (a) is from the fact that ∇ fi(xki ) − ∇ fi(x∗i )2 ≤ Mi xki − xk+1i + xk+1i − x∗i 2 ≤ 2Mi xki − xk+1i 2 +
2Mi
xk+1i − x∗i 2. The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1, and the p can be selected as
min
{mi − αNρ2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max − αρ˘2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max
10Mi
ζNσ2i,min
+ Di
,
Di − Nσ
2
i,max
α − Mi
5(D2i +2Mi )
ζNσ2i,min
+
5σ2i,max
ζ
∑N
j=1
ρ
2(k+1)
j,maxσ
2
j,max
σ2j,min
,
2ρ0
ζ − Nαζ − 1
5
∑N
i=1(
ρ
2(k+1)
i,max
ζ2
+ 1N )
σ2i,max
σ2i,min
}
,
(47)
with parameters: 
α <
mi
Nρ2(k+1)i,max σ
2
i,max + ρ˘
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
,
Di > max{ρk+1i,maxσ2i,max,
Nσ2i,max
α
+ Mi},
ρ0 >
N
2α
,
ζ < 2ρ0 − N
α
.
(48)
H Proof of Theorem 3.3
From the updating procedure with noise,
xk+1i = D
−1
i (ATi ρk+1i (c −
∑
j,i
Aj xkj ) + ATi λk + Γk+1i xki − ∇ fi(xki )) + ∆k+1i . (49)
We then derive the expression of ∇ f (xki ) as follows,
∇ f (xki ) = ATi λk − ATi ρk+1i
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ) + Di(xki − xk+1i ) + Di∆k+1i . (50)
It is noted that the only difference, when compared to (32), arises from the additional term ∆k+1i . Due to
the strong convexity assumed, we conduct a similar reasoning as (45) and have the following inequality:
mi
2
xk+1i − x∗i 2
≤ (xk+1i − x∗i )T (ATi (λk − λ∗) − ATi ρk+1i
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ) + Di(xki − xk+1i ) + Di∆k+1i ) +
Mi
2
xki − xk+1i 2 .
(51)
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By summing up over i from 1 to N on both sides of (51), we have
N∑
i=1
mi
2
xk+1i − x∗i 2
≤
N∑
i=1
((xk+1i − x∗i )T (ATi (λk − λ∗) − ATi ρk+1i
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ) + Di(xki − xk+1i ) + Di∆k+1i ) +
Mi
2
xki − xk+1i 2).
(52)
By moving the left hand side to the right hand side, and taking the term Di∆k+1i out of the summation,
we have
N∑
i=1
((xk+1i − x∗i )T (ATi (λk − λ∗) − ATi ρk+1i
N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ) + Di(xki − xk+1i ))︸                                                                                                 ︷︷                                                                                                 ︸
(1)
+
Mi
2
xki − xk+1i 2 − mi2 xk+1i − x∗i 2)︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
(1)
+
N∑
i=1
(xk+1i − x∗i )TDi∆k+1i︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
(2)
≥ 0.
(53)
Therefore, the proof of Theorem 3.2 shown in Appendix J is an analysis on term (1). From Theorem
3.2, there exists p > 0 for parameters within the admissible range defined in (43),
uk − u∗2
G
≥
(1 + p) uk+1 − u∗2
G
. Now combining both terms (1) and (2) to show the convergence rate, it still holds
with almost the same reasoning except one difference. Due to the noise, the upper bound of
λk+1 − λ∗2,
given before as (37), becomesλk+1 − λ∗2
≤ 1
σ2i,min
∇ fi(xki ) − ∇ fi(x∗i ) − ATi (λk − λk+1) − Di(xki − xk+1i ) + ATi ρk+1i N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − x∗j ) + Di∆k+1i
2
≤ 6
σ2i,min
(2Mi
xk+1i − x∗i 2 + Ai(λk − λk+1)2 + (D2i + 2Mi) xki − xk+1i 2 +
ρ
2(k+1)
i,max σ
2
i,max
 N∑
j=1
Aj(xkj − xk+1j )
2 + ρ2(k+1)i,max σ2i,max N∑
j=1
Aj(xk+1j − x∗j )
2 + D2i ∆k+1i 2).
(54)
The changes in the constants here slightly change the range of p selection but do not affect the existence
of p such that
uk − u∗2
G
≥(1 + p) uk+1 − u∗2
G
− 2
N∑
i=1
Di(xk+1i − x∗i )T∆k+1i −
6δ
ζN
N∑
i=1
D2i
σ2i,min
∆k+1i 2
≥(1 + (1 − ˆ)p) uk+1 − u∗2
G
−
N∑
i=1
( 6δD
2
i
ζNσ2i,min
+
Di
ˆp
) ∆k+1i 2 , (55)
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where ˆ ∈ (0, 1). Let a = 1
1+(1−ˆ )p , then
4
uK+1 − u∗2
G
≤a uK + u∗2
G
+
N∑
i=1
( 6pD
2
i
ζNσ2i,min
+
Di
ˆp
)a ∆K+1i 2
≤ · · ·
≤aK+1 u0 − u∗2
G
+
N∑
i=1
( 6pD
2
i
ζNσ2i,min
+
Di
ˆp
)
K+1∑
k=1
ak
∆K+2−ki 2
=aK+1
u0 − u∗2
G
+ RK+1.
(58)
At last, we analyze the utility-privacy tradeoff. With respect to the B∞ sensitivity, based on the
Laplace mechanism [53], let each coordinate of ∆ki for any k, i.i.d. follow Lap(0, DiB∞Kd ) for the composition
across K iterations and d dimensions in pure -LDP. Substituting the above form into (55), we haveuK − u∗2
G
= O(aK u0 − u∗2
G
+ 2Nd(B∞Kd

)2),
which is O˜( NB2∞d3
2
) due to the exponential decaying of the first term. Here we omit all other constants
to avoid the tedious expression on 11−a . Similarly, under (, δ)-LDP, with the strong composition [49], we
only require that each coordinate of ∆ki for any k, i.i.d. follow Lap(0,O( DiB∞√Kd )) and thus the utility
loss is O˜( NB2∞d2
2
). 5
I Proof of Theorem 3.4
For each i ∈ [1 : N],
xk+1i − x∗2 = 2wk+1iN xkik + 2(Id − wk+1i )N xkiˆk +
∑
j,ik, iˆk x
k
j
N
− ηk+1∇ fi(x¯k) + ∆k+1i − x∗
2
=
2wk+1iN (xkik − x∗) + 2(Id − wk+1i )N (xkiˆk − x∗) +
∑
j,ik, iˆk (xkj − x∗)
N
2 + η2k+1 ∇ fi(x¯k) + η−1k+1∆k+1i 2
− 2ηk+1〈
2wk+1i
N
xkik +
2(Id − wk+1i )
N
xk
iˆk
+
∑
j,ik, iˆk x
k
j
N
− x∗,∇ fi(x¯k) + η−1k+1∆k+1i 〉,
(59)
4 As a short comment, when limK→∞
∆Ki 2 → 0, there exists a constant C that ∑Ni=1( 6δD2iζNσ2
i,min
+
Di
ˆ p )
∆Ki 2 ≤
Cmaxi
∆Ki 2. Therefore,
RK+1 ≤ C
K+1∑
k=1
max
i
∆ki 2 aK+2−k . (56)
For any arbitrarily small constant z > 0, there exists k0, such that for any K > 2k0,
C
k0∑
k=1
max
i
∆ki 2 aK+1−k ≤ Cak0 k0∑
k=1
max
i
∆Ki 2 ak0+1−k < z2 .
On the other hand, maxi
∆ki 2 ≤ z(1−c)2Cc for any k > k0. Therefore,
RK ≤ C
k0∑
k=1
max
i
∆ki 2 aK+1−k +C K∑
k=k0+1
max
i
∆ki 2 aK+1−k ≤ z2 +Cmaxi ∆k0+1i 2 K∑
k=k0+1
aK−k ≤ z. (57)
5Note that in relaxed LDP, δ is assumed as a constant and  is sufficiently small. Thus we drop the log( 1δ ) term.
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where x¯k = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
k
i . In the following, we will use the following inequality that, if for i ∈ [1 : N], ωi > 0
and
∑N
i=1 ωi = 1, then for arbitrary N real numbers y[1:N ], the following holds,
(
N∑
i=1
ωiyi)2 ≤
N∑
i=1
ωiy
2
i . (60)
It is noted that in (59), the sum of weights on (xki − x∗) is always the identity. With (60), by taking
expectation on both sides of (59), we have
E[xk+1i − x∗2] ≤ N∑
i=1
xki − x∗2
N
+ η2k+1(G2 + E[(η−1k+1∆k+1i )2]) − 2ηk+1〈x¯k − x∗,∇ fi(x¯k)〉. (61)
By summing up both sides of (61) from i = 1, 2, ..., N, we can bound
∑N
i=1 fi(x¯k) − fi(x∗) as follows,
N∑
i=1
fi(x¯k) − fi(x∗) ≤ 〈x¯k − x∗,
N∑
i=1
∇ fi(x¯k)〉
≤ η−1k+1(
N∑
i=1
xki − x∗2 − xk+1i − x∗2) + ηk+1 N∑
i=1
(G2 + E[(η−1k+1∆k+1i )2]).
(62)
The above is due to the fact that
∑N
i=1 ∇ fi(x∗) = 0 and we drop the constant 12 for brevity. Before we
can derive a global convergence analysis, we need to give an upper bound on
xk+1i − x∗ with the initial
divergence
x0i − x∗ and the noise E[(∆k+1i )2]. It is noted that, with rearrangement on (62) and the fact∑N
i=1 fi(xki ) − fi(x∗) ≥ 0,
E[
N∑
i=1
xk+1i − x∗2] ≤ E[ N∑
i=1
xki − x∗2 + η2k+1(G2 + (η−1k+1∆k+1i )2)]. (63)
When we select ηk = 1
c
√
k
,
∑K
k=1 η
2
k
=
∑N
k=1
1
c2k
≤ logK+1
c2
since k ≤ K. The above render an upper bound
on
xki − x∗2 that
E[
N∑
i=1
xki − x∗2] ≤ E[ N∑
i=1
x0i − x∗2 + logK + 1c2 N(G2 + V2)],
with the assumption E[(∆ki /ηk)2] ≤ V2. Thus, (62) can be further formulated as
K−1∑
k=0
N∑
i=1
E[ fi(x¯k)] − fi(x∗)
K
≤
∑K−1
k=1 (η−1k+1 − η−1k )
∑N
i=1
xki − x∗2 + η−11 ∑Ni=1 x0i − x∗2 +∑K−1k=0 ηk+1N(G2 + V2)
K
=O(c
√
K
∑N
i=1
x0i − x∗2 + Nc−1(logK + 2)√K + 1(G2 + V2)
K
),
(64)
and E[∑Ni=1 fi(∑K−1k=0 ∑Ni=1 xki /NK) − fi(x∗)] ≤ ∑K−1k=0 ∑Ni=1 E[ fi (x¯k )]− fi (x∗)K . Here we use the trick of SGD proof
that selecting such a sequence of decreasing step size. To finally disclose the utility-privacy tradeoff, we
specify the parameter of noise. In pure -DP setting, since the sensitivity is bounded by B∞ in l∞, on
each dimension we may add a noise following Lap(0, dKηkB∞ ) to produce a total  loss from d dimensions
and K iterations. Under the relaxed (, δ)-DP setting, with the strong composition theorem [49], the
variance E[(∆ki /ηk)2] can be reduced to O˜(d(
√
dKB∞
 )2). Substituting those into (64), we complete the
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proof of the Theorem that
pure  − LDP : c
∑N
i=1
x0i − x∗2√
K
+
N(logK + 2)(G2 + d3K2B2∞
2
)
c
√
K
= O˜
(√∑N
i=1
x0i − x∗2√N(G + d3/2KB∞ )√
K
)
relaxed (, δ) − LDP : O˜
(√∑N
i=1
x0i − x∗2√N(G + d√KB∞ )√
K
)
= O˜
(√∑N
i=1
x0i − x∗2√NdB∞

)
,
(65)
where K is sufficiently large. For the general communication graph, one may apply the "average process"
technique used in [8], which leads to a similar result.
J Proof of Theorem 4.1
Here, we still assume the N agents are connected in a complete graph for simplicity and redefine the
updating subroutine for agent i as
xk+1i = x¯
k − ηk+1∇ fi(x¯k) + ∆k+1i .
Let ∆¯k = 1N
∑N
i=1 ∆
k
i , y
k+1
i = x¯
k − ηk+1∇ fi(x¯k) and y¯k+1 = x¯k − ηk+1N
∑N
i=1 ∇ fi(x¯k). Here, we fix ηk+1 = 1M .
It is noted that
fi(x¯k+1) − fi( y¯k+1) = 1bi
bi∑
j=1
[
φ(〈x¯k+1, zij〉, lij ) − φ(〈 y¯k+1, zij〉, lij )
]
≤ L
bi
bi∑
j=1
〈 x¯k+1 − y¯k+1, zij〉 = Lbi bi∑j=1
〈∆¯k+1, zij〉 . (66)
Under B2 sensitivity, we consider applying a Gaussian mechanism instead of using Laplace noise. With
ηk =
1
M , we assume ∆
k
i for each k and i is i.i.d. following a Gaussian distribution N (0, O˜( KB
2
2
M22
) × Id)
for (, δ)-LDP [10]. Now we apply the following fact with respect to (sub)Gaussian variables [61]: if
b = (b1, b2, ..., bd) is a vector of independent mean-zero σ-(sub)Gaussian, then
E[|〈b, c〉|] ≤ σ ‖c‖
for c ∈ Rd. Thus, with the above assumptions, (66) can be further bounded as
fi(x¯k+1) − fi( y¯k+1) ≤ O˜
(
C2L
√
KB2
M
)
. (67)
On the other hand, with the Taylor theorem,
fi( y¯k+1) ≤ fi(x¯k) − ηk+1N 〈
N∑
j=1
∇ fj(x¯k),∇ fi(x¯k)〉 + M
2
ηk+1N N∑
j=1
∇ fj(x¯k)
2 . (68)
Let F(x) = ∑Ni=1 fi(x). Since fi(x) is m-strongly convex, F(x) is Nm-strongly convex. With the strong
convexity,
F(x∗) − F(x) ≥ − 1
2Nm
‖∇F(x)‖2 .
By summing up both sides of (69) from i = 1 to N and subtracting F(x∗), we have
F( y¯k+1) − F(x∗) =
N∑
i=1
fi( y¯k+1) − fi(x∗) ≤ F(x¯k) − F(x∗) −
(
ηk+1
N
− Mη
2
k+1
2N
) ∇F(x¯k)2
= (1 − m
M
)(F(x¯k) − F(x∗)).
(69)
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Putting things together, we have
F(x¯k+1) − F(x∗) ≤ F( y¯k+1) − F(x∗) + O˜
(
NC2L
√
KB2
M
)
≤ (1 − m
M
)(F(x¯k) − F(x∗)) + O˜
(
NC2L
√
KB2
M
)
≤ (1 − m
M
)k+1(F(x¯0) − F(x∗)) + O˜
(
M
m
NC2L
√
KB2
M
)
.
(70)
Therefore, F(x¯K )−F(x∗) = O˜(
√
MNC2LB2
m3/2 ), when K = O˜(Mm ). 6 Here we use the fact that elog(1−
m
M ) ≤ e− mM .
K Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is very similar to that of Theorem 4.1. When ‖∇ fi(x)‖1 ≤ C1,
E
[| fi(x + ∆) − fi(x)|] ≤ E[ sup
‖c ‖1≤C1
|〈c,∆〉|]
Still from [61], when ∆ is a vector of d i.i.d σ-(sub)Gaussian variables,
E
[
sup
‖c ‖1≤C1
|〈c,∆〉|] ≤ O (√log dC1σ) . (71)
As for the noise, one can do a similar reasoning as that in Theorem 4.1. Under eitherB1 orB2 sensitivity,
we may apply the Gaussian mechanism same as 4.1 and assume the noise ∆ki following N (0, O˜( KB
2
1
M22
)× Id)
or N (0, O˜( KB22
M22
) × Id), respectively. With the error control as (71), substituting the noise expression
into (70), the upper bound follows.
In the following, we first introduce the random gradient descent in a private version. Without loss of
generality, we only focus on the centralized case to optimize a function f (x) and one can easily generalize
the following results with the proof of Theorem 4.1 to the decentralized case. As assumed before, f is
m-strongly convex and Mˆ-coordinate smooth. ‖∇ f ‖1 ≤ C1.
xk+1[lk+1] = xk[lk+1] − ηk+1∇ f (xk)[lk+1] + ∆k+1, (72)
while xk+1[l] = xk[l], l , lk+1 for l = 1, 2, ..., d. Here, lk+1 is i.i.d. uniformly selected from [1 : d].
Intuitively, in(72), privacy loss is shrunk to a single dimension, while the step size also scales by 1d
compared to conventional GD. Here we assume that ∆k+1 is i.i.d. in a Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2),
where we will determine σ soon.
In the following, we fix ηk+1 = 1/Mˆ. By Taylor series and the component Lipschitz assumption, at
round (k + 1),
E
[
f (xk+1)] (a)≤ E[ f (xk − ηk+1∇ f (xk)[lk+1]elk+1 )] + C1d E[|∆k+1 |]
(b)≤ f (xk) − ηk+1E
[(∇ f (xk)[lk+1])2] + (ηk+1)2Mˆ
2
E
[(∇ f (xk)[lk+1])2] + C1d σ
(c)≤ f (xk) − 1
2dMˆ
∇ f (xk)2 + C1
d
σ.
(73)
Here, (a) is due to the fact that subsampling on dimensions is uniform and in expectation, the coordinate
Lipschitz of f is bounded by C1d . (b) is the Taylor theorem on dimension lk+1 and (c) is due to the fact
that ηk+1 = 1/Mˆ and Elk+1 [(∇ f (xk)[lk+1])2] = ‖
∇ f (xk )‖2
d .
6With such selection of K , the two terms summed in (70) are in the same order with respect to O˜.
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With the m-strongly convex assumption of f (x),
f (x∗) − f (xk) ≥ − 1
2m
∇ f (xk)2 .
Substituting the above into (73), where f (x∗) is subtracted in both sides, we have
E[ f (xk+1)] − f (x∗) ≤ (1 − m
dMˆ
)(E[ f (xk)] − f (x∗)) + C1
d
σ
≤ (1 − m
dMˆ
)k+1( f (x0) − f (x∗)) +
k+1∑
j=1
(1 − m
dMˆ
)k+1−j C1
d
σ
≤ e−m(k+1)dMˆ + dMˆ
m
· C1
d
σ.
(74)
Now we turn to the privacy part. It is a bit different from before as we have to deal with the
coordinate-wise sensitivity. We say f (·) is with Bc sensitivity if
Bc ≥ sup
fˆ , f ∈F
√√
d∑
l=1
sup
x∈C
(∇ f (x)[l] − ∇ fˆ (x)[l])2.
Bc can be viewed as the l2 norm of coordinate sensitivity. Recall the step size is 1Mˆ , we consider fixing
σ2 = (1+a)(B
c )2K
2Mˆ2d
and we will determine a in the following. First, from (70), we select K = O˜(d Mˆm ). Across
K iterations, let Al, l ∈ [1 : d], denote the number of times that l-th dimension selected as the descent
direction. Due to the uniformness, E[Al] = µ = Kd = O˜( Mˆm ). Now we apply Chernoff bound,
Pr(Al ≥ (1 + a)µ) ≤ e−
−a2µ
2+a .
Therefore, for all l ∈ [1 : d], Al < (1+ a)µ, the probability is upper bounded by de−
a2µ
2+a with union bound.
For any f , fˆ ∈ F , let Bc
l
= supx |∇ f (x)[l] − ∇ fˆ (x)[l]|. With the strong composition of privacy loss [49],
it is noted that
(1 + a)2(Bc)2K
d
∑d
l=1 Al(Bcl )2
>
2(Bc)2∑d
l=1(Bcl )2
≥ 2
when all l ∈ [1 : d], Al < (1 + a)µ. For arbitrary constant failure probability, one may select a = O( log dµ ).
To conclude, through RCD, one may obtain a utility bound in terms of Mˆ that O˜(C1MˆBc
m2
). with a similar
reasoning.
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